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I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey period, the appellate courts made the major-
ity of integral decisions pertaining to the domestic relations field.
Although the field of family law includes a wide array of substan-
tive areas, this article focuses primarily on cases and legislation
pertaining to the dissolution of marriages. Accordingly, the major-
ity of included cases involves efforts by the Illinois courts to inter-
pret and apply the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (the "IMDMA"). The Illinois courts continue to grapple,
however, with the unforeseen and, probably, unintended conse-
quences of the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in In re Marriage
of Leopondo.1 In Leopondo, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the dissolution of a marriage and all of its ancillary issues, L e.,
maintenance, custody, support, and attorney's fees, constitute a
single cause of action. Therefore, these issues are individually un-
appealable until the trial court resolves all the issues indepen-
dently. During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court
specifically upheld the propriety of appealing the bifurcation of a
dissolution proceeding pursuant to its decision in In re Marriage of
Leopondo2 and section 401(b) of the IMDMA.3
The majority of the remaining cases focus on judicial interpreta-
tions and applications of specific provisions of the IMDMA. These
sections of the IMDMA concern dissolution of marriage;4 child
support-contempt-penalties5 and modifications;6 child custody;7
disposition of property; 8 modification and termination of provi-
sions for maintenance, support, and property disposition;9 mainte-
1. See infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
2. 96 Ill. 2d 114, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983).
3. See infra .Aotes 20-37 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 243-58 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 91-134 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 135-82 and accompanying text.
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nance;10 agreements;" attorney's fees;12 support for non-minor
children and educational expenses; 3 and visitation. 14 Addition-
ally, the Illinois Supreme Court reconciled section 4-135 ("Bene-
fits-Exempt") of the Illinois Pension Code with section 503(d) of
the IMDMA. 15 Finally, the Illinois state legislature enacted, inter
alia, several pieces of pertinent legislation during the Survey pe-
riod. These include amending section 610,16 abolishing inter-
spousal tort immunity, 17 expanding the definition of "income,""8
and enacting legislation pertaining to withholding orders.1 9
II. BIFURCATION
In In re Marriage of Bogan,2 ° the Illinois Supreme Court held
that a party to a divorce action may appeal the propriety of a bifur-
cated dissolution judgment itself 2 and further, that an appeal of a
bifurcated judgment is consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court's
holdings in both In re Marriage of Leopondo,22 and in In re Mar-
riage of Cohn.23 In Bogan, the wife appealed the trial court's entry
of a dissolution judgment, over her timely objection, which re-
served for future consideration the issues of maintenance, property
division, and attorney's fees.24 The appellate court ruled that, ac-
cording to the Leopondo decision, the wife could not appeal the
bifurcated dissolution judgment because the ancillary issues of
maintenance, property division, and attorney's fees had not been
resolved."
10. See infra notes 166, 183-89 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 247-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infm notes 191-214 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 215-33 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
20. 116 Ill. 2d 72, 506 N.E.2d 1243 (1986).
21. Id.
22. Bogan, 116 Ill. 2d at 76, 506 N.E.2d at 1243; In re Marriage of Leopondo, 96 Il1.
2d 114, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983).
23. Bogan, 116 11. 2d at 80, 506 N.E.2d at 1246; In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 11. 2d
190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982).
24. Bogan, 116 Ill. 2d at 74, 506 N.E.2d at 1243.
25. In Leopondo, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a petition for dissolution ad-
vances a single claim for an order dissolving the spouse's marriage, and that the remain-
ing issues, such as custody, division of property, and support, are merely ancillary.
Leopondo, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 449 N.E.2d 137 (1983). Thus, to further the goal of avoiding
piecemeal litigation, including appeals, arising out of the same litigation, the court held
that appeals of ancillary issues are barred until all the issues involved in the divorce
1988]
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Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court considered two issues
in Bogan. First, the court considered whether Leopondo foreclosed
appeals of bifurcated dissolution judgments when appellants solely
challenged the propriety of the bifurcation itself and did not dis-
pute the grounds of the divorce.26 Second, the court considered
whether, in this particular instance, the trial court erred by finding
that the circumstances warranted the entry of the bifurcated
judgment.
Concerning the appealability issue, the Bogan court, pursuant to
Leopondo, held permissible an appeal to decide the sole issue of the
propriety of bifurcation. 2s  The court rejected the husband's the-
ory that bifurcation appeals vitiated Leopondo's goal of avoiding
piecemeal litigation.29 In rejecting this theory, the court ruled that
appeals of bifurcated dissolution judgments did not promote piece-
meal litigation.30 The court reasoned that barring a party from ap-
pealing a bifurcated dissolution judgment until the resolution of all
ancillary issues3 would result in the objecting party having no ap-
pellate review in a case in which the trial court incorrectly ordered
the bifurcated judgment.32
After determining the propriety of appealing bifurcated dissolu-
tion judgments, the Bogan Court addressed whether the trial
court's bifurcation order was in accord with the Illinois Supreme
Court's holding in Cohn.33 Section 401(b) of the IMDMA governs
action are resolved by the trial court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a). ILL. S. CT.
R. 304(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 304(a) (1985).
26. Bogan, 116 Ill. 2d at 74, 506 N.E.2d at 1243.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 76, 506 N.E.2d at 1244.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Cohn, 93 Il1. 2d at 199, 443 N.E.2d at 545). The Cohn court held that
bifurcated dissolution judgments are only proper under "appropriate circumstances."
Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d at 199, 443 N.E.2d at 545. In other words, absent a showing of appropri-
ate circumstances, bifurcation should be denied. Id.
The Cohn court enumerated the appropriate circumstances delineated in the Historical
and Practice Notes to § 401(b) of the IMDMA. The following appropriate circumstances
are suggested:
For example, although the court may have personal jurisdiction over the hus-
band so that it could order him to pay child support or maintenance, the court
may consider it inappropriate to do so at that time due to the husband's inabil-
ity to make payments or due to the fact that the court has set aside an adequate
fund for the child support pursuant to section 503(d). The court may also re-
serve such issues when it does not have in personam jurisdiction over the re-
spondent. Likewise, if the child is not residing with either party, the question of
custody may also be reserved.
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bifurcated dissolution judgments.34 The Bogan court held that the
appropriate circumstances necessary to justify a bifurcation order
need not be exactly one of those enumerated in Cohn but rather, of
the same type. 3  Applying this test, the court concluded that the
circumstances in Bogan did not justify a bifurcated dissolution
judgment.
Specifically, the court rejected the husband's argument that his
inability to perform job-related social functions expected by his
employer constituted an appropriate circumstance warranting a bi-
furcated dissolution judgment.3 6 The court reasoned that by per-
mitting the trial court's unlimited discretion in awarding
bifurcation judgments, certain inequities could arise. Finally, the
Bogan court suggested that the section 401(b) requirements, ex-
panded in Cohn, will be drawn so narrowly that perhaps no argu-
ment could be made outside the statute and Cohn.
III. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 3
The appellate court decisions during the Survey period focused
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 40, para. 401(b) Historical and Practice Notes, at 105 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987).
34. Section 401(b) of the IMDMA provides as follows:
Such judgment shall not be entered unless, to the extent it has jurisdiction to do
so, the court has considered, approved, reserved or made provision for child
custody, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support, the main-
tenance of either spouse and the disposition of property. The court may enter a
judgment for dissolution which reserves any such issues either upon
(i) agreement of the parties, or (ii) motion of either party and a finding by the
court that appropriate circumstances exist.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401(b) (1985).
35. Bogan, 116 Ill. 2d at 80, 506 N.E.2d at 1246.
36. Id. at 80-81, 506 N.E.2d at 1246.
37. Id. at 80, 506 N.E.2d at 1246. The court noted that the trial court could be put in
the undesirable position of deciding marital property rights that have become entangled
with the supervening rights of third parties, including subsequent spouses. Id. Further,
an early dissolution judgment could complicate matters with respect to the rights of a
surviving spouse in the event of a supervening death. Id. Moreover, other potential
problems including the loss of ability to file joint income tax returns. The loss of medical
insurance coverage and the loss of marital property treatment for property accumulated
during the intervening period between the entry of the dissolution order and the final
dissolution of property rights could arise. Id.
38. Section 505(a)(1) of the IMDMA prescribes mandatory minimum child support
guidelines. The number of children dictate the percentage of the child support obligor's
net income that will be fixed as the support obligation. These guidelines have dual
ramifications. On the one hand, they tend to make child support awards predictable and
uniform. On the other hand, these "minimum" guidelines tend to become the standard.
Section 505(a) of the IMDMA provides as follows:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of
invalidity of marriage, a proceeding for child support following dissolution of
Loyola University Law Journal
on the issue of child support enforcement. In In re Robertson,39 the
wife filed a petition to revive a sixteen-year-old judgment against
the husband for past due child support. The trial court entered
judgment in the amount of approximately one hundred and
twenty-five thousand dollars, and the Illinois Appellate Court for
First District affirmed.
On appeal to the appellate court, the husband's argument in-
cluded various jurisdictional challenges to the original decree, such
as improper venue, lack of personal jurisdiction, and lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. In addition, the husband argued that pay-
ments made by his mother's trust to his children satisfied his sup-
port obligations.4 The court first rejected the jurisdictional
challenges based on the doctrine of estoppel by remarriage.41 The
court held that once the husband accepted the benefit of remarry-
ing from the divorce decree, he was estopped from raising any ju-
risdictional challenges. 42
In response to the husband's contention regarding his mother's
trust payments to the children, the court ruled that payments to
children by one other than the obligor will satisfy the support obli-
gation only if there is evidence of manifested intention to pay such
support obligations by the obligor.4 3 Because no such intent ex-
isted, the husband was foreclosed from asserting that these trust
disbursements constituted his child support payments.
In Blisset v. Blisset," the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse or any proceeding authorized under Section 601 of this Act, the court
may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the
marriage to pay an amount reasonable and necessary for his support, without
regard to marital misconduct.
(1) The Court shall determine the minimum amount of support by using
the following guidelines:
Percent of Supporting
Number of Children Party's Net Income
1 20%
2 25%
3 32%
4 40%
5 45%
6 or more 50%
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505(a) (1985).
39. 151 Ill. App. 3d 214, 503 N.E.2d 1279 (1st Dist. 1986).
40. Id. at 224, 502 N.E.2d at 1285-1286.
41. Id. at 223, 502 N.E.2d at 1285.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 224-25, 502 N.E.2d at 1286.
44. 144 I11. App. 3d 1088, 495 N.E.2d 608 (4th Dist. 1986).
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District considered whether equitable estoppel bars future child
support payments when the wife agreed to the husband's nonpay-
ment of child support in exchange for the husband's forbearance
from the exercise of his visitation rights.4 In Blisset, the court en-
tered a dissolution judgment ordering the husband to pay forty
dollars per week in child support. Subsequently, the wife brought
a criminal action against her husband for failure to pay the court
ordered child support. Thereafter, the parties agreed in writing
that the husband would restrict his visitation to specific times in
exchange for the wife's dropping of all criminal charges for non-
support." The parties never brought an action to incorporate this
agreement into the dissolution judgment nor to enter an order re-
lieving the husband from his original support obligations.47 The
husband, however, ceased making payments. The wife then
brought an action to collect past due child support payments. The
trial court denied the wife's claim for delinquent payments, finding
that the husband relied on the wife's promise to forego payments
"to his detriment when he relinquished his right to exercise unlim-
ited visitation with his children. '48
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District disagreed
with the trial court. The appellate court held void as against public
policy an agreement between ex-spouses relieving the obligor from
child support payments in consideration for waiving the right to
visitation.49 The court further held that accrued arrearages during
the period in which the husband forgoes child support payments in
reliance on his wife's promise were collectable.50 The court ruled
that the determination of the adequacy and amount of child sup-
port is the trial court's responsibility, and not that of the parent.51
If a parent lacks adequate child support, he or she likely will seek
financial assistance from the state treasury. Therefore, to allow
parents to determine child support obligations could result in a
burdensome effect on both the custodians and the State of Illinois.
Although the court rejected the husband's equitable estoppel ar-
gument, it indicated that such a defense would be appropriate if the
defendant showed prejudice or hardship and injury due to the de-
45. Id. at 1090, 495 N.E.2d at 610.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1092, 495 N.E.2d at 612.
50. Id. at 1092, 495 N.E.2d at 610.
51. Id.
19881 495
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lay in child support payments.5 2 In Blisset, however, the court
stated that the requirement to pay accumulated support in one
payment as opposed to weekly payments did not cause injury suffi-
cient to invoke an equitable estoppel defense.5 3
There is, however, a split in the districts regarding the enforce-
ability of such an agreement. One court has upheld a similar
agreement. 54 In light of these discrepancies between the districts,
the practicing attorney should be aware that the Illinois Supreme
Court likely will have to rule on the propriety and effect of such
agreements.
The problems associated with the failure of the noncustodial
parent to make support payments are well documented by the me-
dia and are painfully obvious to both the custodial parent and to
the children involved in these situations. Blisset should be upheld
when the Illinois Supreme Court rules on this issue. Agreements
tying non-payment to the forbearance of visitation rights should be
found void as against public policy. As Blisset noted, such agree-
ments are selfish on the parts of both the payor and the payee, but
unfortunately, it is the children who suffer most. Additionally, in
these strained economic times, a noncustodial parent who is unem-
ployed over an extended period could be coerced into such an
agreement.
IV. CHILD CUSTODY
The primary focus in child custody determinations is the "best
interests of the children."55 The "no fault" concept of the
IMDMA permeates child custody proceedings. For example, sec-
tion 602(b) instructs the trial court that it "shall not consider the
conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship with the child.15 6 Rather, to determine custody, trial
courts should consider factors enumerated in section 602 of the
52. Id. at 1093, 495 N.E.2d at 612.
53. Id. at 1094, 495 N.E.2d at 613 (citing Jones v. Meade, 126 111. App. 3d 897, 903,
467 N.E.2d 657, 661 (4th Dist. 1984)).
54. In Bartlett v. Bartlett, 70 Ill. App. 3d 661, 389 N.E.2d 15 (3d Dist. 1979), the
Third District upheld such an agreement. In Bartlett, the wife agreed to forego court
ordered child support payments in return for the husband's agreement to forego legal
entitlement to visitation rights, and the court precluded the mother from collecting past
due payments from the father on the grounds of equitable estoppel. Id. at 661-62, 389
N.E.2d at 16-17. The Bartlett court however, required the husband to make all prospec-
tive support payments. Id.
55. Nye v. Nye, 411 Il1. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952).
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 19
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IMDMA. 7 The significant decisions in the area of child custody
tend to arise in joint custody cases when one parent petitions to
remove the child from the state.
A. Relevant Factors in Custody Awards"8
In In re Marriage of Soraparu,59 the father appealed the trial
court's decision awarding permanent custody to the mother. The
trial court based its decision, in part, on the father's failure to make
temporary child support payments. The Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District held that delinquency by the obligor in mak-
ing child support payments is a relevant factor in determining the
child's best interests and thus properly may be evaluated by the
trial court when awarding custody.6'
In In re Marriage of Anderson,61 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District applied the "best interest" test in the same
manner as the First District 62 in determining whether a parent who
57. See infra note 58.
58. Section 602 provides as follows:
Best Interest of Child. (a) The court shall determine custody in accordance
with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and
(6) the physical violence or threat .of physical violence by the child's
potential custodian, whether directed against the child or directed against
another person but witnessed by the child.
(b) The court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to that child.
(c) The court shall presume that the maximum involvement and
cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral and
emotional well being of their child is in the best interest of the child. However,
such presumption shall not be construed as a presumption that an order
awarding joint custody is in the best interest of the child.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602 (1985).
59. 147 Il1. App. 3d 857, 498 N.E.2d 565 (1st Dist. 1986).
60. Id. at 865, 498 N.E.2d at 570.
61. 145 I1. App. 3d 746, 496 N.E.2d 346 (2d Dist. 1986).
62. The appellate court ruled that a removal petition filed by the residential custo-
dian, when both parents are awarded joint custody, is not to be treated as a petition for
modification of custody which requires, inter alia, a showing of endangerment to the
child. Rather, it should be treated as a removal petition. In re Marriage of Bednar, 146
Ill. App. 3d 704, 708, 496 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (1st Dist. 1986). For a further discussion of
Bednar, see Murphy & Lane, Family Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 549, 585 (1986).
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has joint custody should be granted permission to remove the chil-
dren from the state.63 In Anderson, the trial court incorporated
into the divorce decree a written separation agreement providing
for joint custody. The children resided with the mother during the
school year and with their father during the summer. The mother
was a nurse and desired to move to Phoenix to pursue a part-time
employment opportunity. The trial court denied the mother's re-
moval petition and the appellate court affirmed, holding that part-
time employment was an insufficient basis for removal.6
In reaching this decision, the court enumerated three factors
which trial courts should consider in determining whether the best
interests of the children are served by the move.6 First, the court
should consider whether a sensible reason for the move exists. For
example, a career or financial advancement of the custodial parent
may qualify as a sensible reason for the move.6 6 The same oppor-
tunity, however, should not be available locally.67 Second, the
court should determine whether the move will benefit the child.6 s
The court indicated that an indirect benefit will suffice and may be
illustrated by the fact that the custodial parent will be a happier
and better adjusted parent.69 Additionally, consideration should
be given to the quality of the children's education, housing, and
child care available in the new location.7 0 Third, the court should
consider whether the removal would prevent "reasonable visita-
tion" by the non-residential parent.71
Applying these factors, the Anderson court emphasized that lo-
cal relocation was a preferable alternative. The court stressed that
thz father took an active role in raising the children pursuant to the
joint custody agreement.72 In view of Anderson, parents in joint
custody situations would be well advised to take full advantage of
the visitation arrangement and pursue an active role in the lives of
their children. The more difficult decision for a reviewing court
63. Anderson, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 496 N.E.2d at 349.
64. Id. at 752, 496 N.E.2d at 350.
65. Id. at 751, 496 N.E.2d at 349.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 751, 496 N.E.2d at 348.
72. Id. at 752, 496 N.E.2d at 345-49. The Anderson court appropriately noted the
extensive involvement of the father in the children's lives detailing daily telephone calls,
contact with the children's school teachers, and physical custody every other weekend, on
holidays, and summer vacation, which also provided for contact with the paternal grand-
parents and other relatives. Id.
[Vol. 19
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will occur in the instance of an active parent, as found in Anderson,
balanced against the other parent with legitimate career
advancement.
B. Modification of Custody within Two Years
of the Custody Award
According to section 610(a) of the IMDMA, 73 modification of
custody awards within two years should be granted only in emer-
gency situations and after specific findings are made pursuant to
the amended statute. In In re Marriage of Clark,74 the appellate
court denied the father's petition to modify custody within two
years of the award.75 The court concluded that the father did not
present clear and convincing evidence that the child's environment
posed any serious danger to the child's physical, moral, or emo-
tional health.76 Interestingly, the court found that evidence of the
child's poor performance in school and the mother's apparent fail-
ure to respond to concerns of the school indicated nothing more
than "the general aftermath" of divorce. 77 Other than this evi-
dence, the court determined that the child had adjusted to his sur-
roundings and was in no danger as required by section 610.78
In In re Marriage of Zucco, 79 the mother petitioned to modify
the joint custody arrangement under which she had residential cus-
73. The relevant portion of section 610 of the IMDMA reads as follows:
Modification. (a) Unless by stipulation of the parties, no motion to modify a
custody judgment may be made earlier than 2 years after its date, unless the
court permits it to be made on the bases of affidavits that there is reason to
believe the child's present environment may endanger seriously his physical,
mental, moral or emotional health.
(b) The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds by
clear and convincing evidence, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the
prior judgment or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the
prior judgment, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or
his custodian, or in the case of a joint custody arrangement that a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child or either of both parties having cus-
tody and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.
In the case of joint custody, if the parties agree to a termination of a joint cus-
tody arrangement, the court shall so terminate the joint custody and make any
modification which is in the child's best interest. The court shall state in its
decision specific findings of fact in support of its modification or termination of
joint custody if either parent opposes the modification or termination.
P.A. 82-593, 1987 11. Laws 525.
74. 149 Ill. App. 3d 613, 500 N.E.2d 1092 (3d Dist. 1986).
75. Id. at 616, 500 N.E.2d at 1092.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 617, 500 N.E.2d at 1094.
78. For content of section 610, see supra note 73.
79. 150 Il1. App. 3d 146, 501 N.E.2d 875 (5th Dist. 1986).
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tody of the children.80 The mother sought full custody because of
her remarriage and her intention to move to another school dis-
trict. The trial court denied the mother's petition and acceded to
the father's counter-petition for primary physical custody. The
trial court partially relied on the testimony and the preference of
the six-year-old son in determining custody."' Additionally, the
trial court based its decision on the fact that the child would re-
ceive a religious upbringing with the father and not with the
mother.s2
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed the
lower court's decision primarily for two reasons.8 3 First, the appel-
late court determined that the trial court erred in relying on the
preference of the six-year-old son.8 4 Although section 602(a) of the
IMDMA provides that a child's preference about his custodian are
a relevant factor to be considered by the court, those wishes should
affect the court's decision only when the child's preference is based
upon reasons related to his best interests.85 In the present case, the
child gave no reasons for his preference, either during the court-
ordered home study or during the in chambers interview. 6 Sec-
ond, the court held that the trial court erred by considering
whether the child would be afforded a religious upbringing.8 7 The
court specifically stated that a custody decision based on religion
would violate the establishment clause of the first amendment of
the United States Constitution.88 The court, however, stated that
"consideration of religion may be proper where a child is shown to
have actual religious needs."8 9
The Zucco court aptly demonstrated the problems inherent in
considering the wishes of pre-adolescent children pursuant to sec-
tion 602(a) of the IMDMA. 90 Although section 602(a) places no
80. Id. at 148-49, 501 N.E.2d at 876.
81. Id. at 152, 501 N.E.2d at 878-79. "'Physical custody' means the right and obli-
gation to provide a home for the child and to make the day-to-day decisions required
during the time the child is actually with the parent having such custody." 32A WORDS
AND PHRASES 40 (Permanent ed. 1987).
82. Id. at 153, 501 N.E.2d at 879-80.
83. Id. at 156, 501 N.E.2d at 881.
84. Id. at 152, 501 N.E.2d at 879.
85. Id. See supra note 58.
86. Id. at 153, 501 N.E.2d at 879.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 154, 501 N.E.2d at 880.
89. Id. at 154-155, 501 N.E.2d at 880. A child's religious needs may be proven either
through direct testimony from a child sufficiently mature to form an intelligent opinion
on the subject or through witnesses. Id.
90. For a discussion of section 602(a), see supra note 58.
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age restriction on the child, it is true, as the court noted, that a pre-
adolescent child may base his decision to remain with a parent on
factors that are not related to his best interests.
V. PROPERTY
A. Pensions
During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether a fireman's pension fund is marital property subject to ap-
portionment under section 50391 of the IMDMA.92 In In re Mar-
riage of Hacket, the parties were married for twenty- seven years
prior to their divorce and during their marriage, the husband was
employed as a fireman. The court affirmed the appellate court's
rule 23 order and held that a vested pension 93 is a form of deferred
compensation acquired during the years of employment and, thus,
is marital property.94
The court further determined that this classification of the pen-
sion fund as marital property does not conflict with section 4-13595
91. Section 503 of the IMDMA, with certain exceptions listed in 503(a), states:
(a) For purposes of this act, "marital property" means all property acquired
by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is
known as "non-marital" property:
(b) For purposes of distribution of property pursuant to this section, all
property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of
dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage, including non-
marital property transferred into some form of co-ownership between the
spouses, is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held
individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint ten-
ancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property.
The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the prop-
erty was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this section.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(a), (b) (1985).
92. In re Marriage of Hacket, 113 Ill. 2d 286, 292, 497 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (1986).
93. A "vested pension" refers to a pension right that is not subject to condition of
forfeiture if the employment relationship terminates in the interim. 44 WORDS AND
PHRASES 57 (Permanent ed. 1987).
94. Hacket, 113 I1. 2d at 293, 497 N.E.2d at 1155.
95. Section 4-135 of the Illinois Pension Code, entitled "Benefits-Exempt" provides
as follows:
No portion of the pension fund shall, either before or after its order of distribu-
tion to any retired firefighter or his or her beneficiaries, be held, seized, taken
subject to, or detained or levied on by virtue of any process, injunction interloc-
utory or other order or judgment, or any process or proceeding whatever issued
by any court of this State, for the payment or satisfaction in whole or in part of
any debt, damages, claim, demand or judgment against any firefighter or his or
her beneficiaries, but the fund shall be held, secured and distributed for the
purposes of pensioning such firefighter and beneficiaries and for no other pur-
poses whatever.
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of the Illinois pension code which protects a fireman's pension
from creditors.96 Rather, classifying vested pension rights as mari-
tal property provides for a division of the pension benefits between
those individuals whom the statute was meant to protect. 97
After the holding in Hacket, there should no longer be any
doubt that a spouse's retirement benefits are marital property to
the extent that such benefits were earned during the marriage.
Although challenges will continue, as evidenced by the -igument
espoused in Hacket, it appears certain that a pension interest will
be valued at the date of dissolution.
B. Valuing Professional Corporations
In In re Marriage of Rubinstein," the Illinois Appellate Court
for the Second District held that a practitioner's goodwill should
be considered when determining the value of a professional corpo-
ration.99 The trial court awarded the wife unallocated support in
the amount of twenty-eight hundred dollars per month. 00 The trial
court did not include the value of the corporate goodwill °10 in de-
termining the worth of Mr. Rubinstein's medical practice.10 2 On
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 108-1/2, para. 4-135 (1985).
96. Hacker, 113 Ill. 2d at 292, 497 N.E.2d at 1155.
97. Id.
98. 145 Il1. App. 3d 31, 495 N.E.2d 659 (2d Dist. 1986).
99. Id. at 36, 495 N.E.2d at 663. In Rubinstein, the parties married at the age of
twenty-one and divorced thirteen years later. Id. at 32, 495 N.E.2d at 660. When they
married each had recently graduated from college with Bachelor's degrees and the hus-
band was about to begin medical school. The wife worked as a high school English
teacher in the Chicago public school system. During that period, the parties understood
that the wife would support the family while Dr. Rubinstein studied medicine and that,
subsequently Mrs. Rubinstein would further her education and career. Id.
Dr. Rubinstein pursued his medical training for nine years while his wife taught for
ten-and-a-half years. Id. at 33, 495 N.E.2d at 660. Mrs. Rubinstein provided the sole
source of funds while the husband studied medicine. During the interim, Mrs. Rubin-
stein attended night school to earn a Master's degree in special education, managed the
household, and took care of the general household needs. When the couple's second
child was born, Mrs. Rubinstein terminated her employment. At the time of the divorce
action, Mrs. Rubinstein was pursuing an MBA and planned on obtaining employment in
the business sector, rather than returning to teaching. Id. Finally, Mrs. Rubinstein con-
tinued to reside in the marital home with the couple's two minor children.
As a medical doctor Mr. Rubinstein specialized in internal medicine. He practiced out
of a medical corporation, earning a gross income of S10,313 monthly. In addition, he had
a profit sharing account worth approximately $50,000 and a pension plan worth $11,700.
Id.
100. Id. at 34, 495 N.E.2d at 661.
101. Goodwill is defined as "the value of a business or practice that exceeds the com-
bined value of the physical assets." 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property
§ 23.04[l] (M. Bender ed. 1984).
102. Rubenstein, 145 Ill. App. at 35-36, 495 N.E.2d at 662.
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appeal, the wife contended the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to include the husband's medical practice in the division of
the spouse's marital property. 10 3 Specifically, the wife contended
that the goodwill of the husband's professional corporation should
be included.104
The appellate court analyzed Second and Fifth District decisions
concerning whether the value of a professional corporation's good-
will should be considered in appraising its worth. 105 The Ruben-
stein decision ultimately relied on section 503(d)(2), 106 which
requires the trial courts to consider, among other things, "the
value of the property set apart to each spouse."'' 0 7 The court rea-
soned that ignoring goodwill as a marital asset could result in an
undervaluation of the practice and stock of the professional corpo-
ration, leading to an inequitable distribution of the marital prop-
erty in the dissolution judgment. 0 8
Furthermore, the Rubinstein court held that, although a medical
degree is not marital property, the trial court should compensate
the spouse whose employment permitted the other spouse to obtain
the medical degree. 109 The court stated that the "contributing
spouse must receive some form of compensation for the financial
effort provided to the student spouse in expectation that the mari-
tal unit will prosper in the future particularly where, as here, the
103. Id. at 34-35, 495 N.E.2d at 661.
104. Id. at 35, 495 N.E.2d at 662.
105. The Second District, in In re Marriage of Leon, 80 Il1. App. 3d 383, 399 N.E.2d
1006 (2d Dist. 1980), dealt with the valuation issue while reviewing the valuation of an
insurance business. The Leon court adopted the view of a California court and ruled that
the goodwill of a business such as a law or medical practice should be classified as marital
property. Id. at 386, 399 N.E.2d at 1006.
In In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (5th Dist. 1986), the
Fifth District appellate court cited Leon with approval when considering the issue of
valuing a professional corporation. Id. at 383, 424 N.E.2d at 424. The White court held
that goodwill should be considered when appraising the value of a professional corpora-
tion. Id. at 384, 424 N.E.2d at 421.
106. Section 503(d)(2) of the IMDMA reads as follows:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of mar-
riage, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of
marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse
or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall assign each
spouse's non-marital property to that spouse. It also shall divide the marital
property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering
all relevant factors, including the value of the property set apart to each spouse.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(d)(2) (1985).
107. Id.
108. Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 38-39, 495 N.E.2d at 664.
109. Id. Neither party contested the fact that Mrs. Rubinstein supported the family
while her husband pursued his medical training. Id.
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husband filed the suit for divorce so soon after the wife completed
her part of the bargain.""' 0
C. Valuing the Goodwill of a Closely-Held Corporation
In In re Marriage of White," I the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Fifth District approved the "capitalization of excess earnings"
method in valuing the goodwill of a dental practice." 2 This
method is accomplished by fixing the amount by which the in-
dependent professional's adjusted earnings exceed the average
earnings of an employee of similar qualifications in the same lo-
cale." 3 The court, however, refused to restrict the trial courts to
one method of valuation." 4
With the decisions in Rubinstein and White, the Second and
Fifth Districts have now brought the issue of valuation of goodwill
in a personal corporation in line with the First District's decision
in In re Marriage of Kapusta. 5 The courts' inclusion of goodwill
in valuing a professional corporation does not give rise to double
consideration to the professional spouse's ability to generate in-
come." 6 In addition, the Rubinstein court has found a method of
compensating a spouse in the position of Mrs. Rubinstein, while
continuing to state that a graduate degree, such as Dr. Rubinstein's
medical degree, is not marital property. In effect, the court consid-
ered factors which would otherwise indicate a marital asset.
D. Valuing a Closely-Held Corporation
at the Date of Dissolution
In In re Marriage of Suarez,17 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District held that the proper date for valuing marital
assets is the date of dissolution.II In Suarez, the husband appealed
110. Id. The court specified three methods of affording compensation: distribution
of marital property; a form of maintenance; and monetary awards based on equitable
standards. Id. Because the wife received no compensation for her financial support to her
husband, the court remanded the cause for further consideration. Id.
111. 151 I1. App. 3d 778, 502 N.E.2d 1084 (5th Dist. 1986).
112. Id. at 781, 502 N.E.2d at 1086-87.
113. Id. at 781, 502 N.E.2d at 1086.
114. Id. at 780, 502 N.E.2d at 1086.
115. 141 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 491 N.E.2d 48 (1st Dist. 1986). For further discussion of
Kapusta, see Murphy & Lane, Family Law, 1985-86 Illinois Law-Survey, 18 LoY. U. CHi.
L.J. 549, 552 (1986) (where the court approved of the consideration of goodwill in valu-
ing a surgeon's medical practice).
116. Rubinstein, 145 11. App. 3d at 37, 495 N.E.2d at 663.
117. 148 Ill. App. 3d 849, 499 N.E.2d 642 (2d Dist. 1986).
118. Id. at 859, 499 N.E.2d at 648.
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the valuation of the family business, claiming that a substantial de-
valuation occurred between the date of the court's valuation and
the dissolution judgment. 19
The appellate court concurred with the husband, holding that
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to re-examine the
business valuation as of the date of dissolution. 120 The court rea-
soned that evidence of the loss of a major sales account by a closely
held corporation should have been presented to the court through
a motion to reopen proofs.' 2'
E. Transfers as Gifts or Marital Property
In In re Marriage of Agazim, 22 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District held that income-producing property trans-
ferred from a father to his daughter was marital property to be
divided upon the dissolution of the daughter's marriage. 23 In
Agazim, the father transferred an interest in an apartment complex
to both of his daughters. The father estimated that the complex
would produce annual income between ten and twenty thousand
dollars to be shared between the daughters. The children signed
articles of agreement and a management agreement. The articles of
agreement compelled the daughters to pay the expenses on the
property from the rental revenue. Additionally,- the daughters
agreed to procure insurance and to pay for real estate taxes for all
necessary repairs. Further, the daughters could not assign, sell, or
transfer the buildings. Despite these limitations, the trial court
held that the transfer constituted a gift and classified the building
as non-marital property. 124
The appellate court reversed, treating the apartment complex as
marital property, and remanded the action for redistribution of the
marital assets. 2 On appeal, the court explained that the IMDMA
establishes a rebuttable presumption that all property acquired
during a marriage is marital.' 26 The court then noted the contrary
presumption that a transfer of property from a parent to a child
119. Id. at 841, 499 N.E.2d at 643.
120. Id. at 862, 499 N.E.2d at 650.
121. Id. at 861, 499 N.E.2d at 649-50.
122. 147 Il1. App. 3d 646, 498 N.E.2d 742 (2d Dist. 1986).
123. Id. at 652, 498 N.E.2d at 747.
124. Id. at 647-52, 498 N.E.2d at 744-47.
125. Id. at 652, 498 N.E.2d at 747.
126. Id. at 648, 498 N.E.2d at 744. See also Hofman v. Hofman, 94 111. 2d 205, 216,
446 N.E.2d 499, 502 (1983).
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constitutes a gift. 27 The court stated that although transactions
subject to these conflicting presumptions leave the trial courts free
to resolve whether the property acquired by the exchange is mari-
tal, 211 the trial court's classification may be disturbed if it is con-
trary to the manifest weight of the evidence.129
In reviewing the trial court's decision that the transfer consti-
tuted a gift, the court reasoned that the donor of a gift must evi-
dence his intent to make such a transfer, which is generally
illustrated by an absolute and irretrievable delivery of the property
to the donee. 130 The court concluded that because the daughter
paid her father consideration for her interest in the building, the
father did not manifest the necessary intent.13' Accordingly, the
appellate court classified the property as marital, and subject to
disbursement pursuant to section 503. 132 The Agazim court also
noted the tax returns filed by the parties. 33 Not only had the do-
nor failed to file a gift tax return, but both parties also treated the
transaction as a sale on their income tax returns.134 Accordingly, a
well-intentioned parent should be cautioned to be consistent in the
manner of giving with respect to both the form and the substance
of the transaction.
VI. MAINTENANCE
A. Cohabitation with "Another Person" Pursuant to
Section 510(b) 35 of the IMDMA
Pursuant to section 510(b) of the IMDMA, cohabitation with
"another person" terminates the obligor's maintenance responsibil-
127. Agazim, 148 I1. App. 3d at 648, 498 N.E.2d at 744. See also In re Marriage of
Rosen, 126 Il1. App. 3d 766, 772, 467 N.E.2d 962, 966 (1st Dist. 1984).
128. Agazim, 148 111. App. 3d at 648, 498 N.E.2d at 744.
129. Id. at 652, 498 N.E.2d at 747.
130. Id. at 648-49, 498 N.E.2d at 744-45.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 652, 498 N.E.2d at 747; The court noted that the legislative purpose of
section 503 was to incorporate the partnership theory of marriage into the treatment of
shared property.
133. Id. at 651, 498 N.E.2d at 746.
134. Id.
135. Section 510(b) of the IMDMA provides
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in a written separation agreement
set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to
pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party, or the
remarriage of the party receiving maintenance or if the party receiving
maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal
basis.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
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ities. 36 In In re Marriage of Antonich, 117 the appellate court for
the Second District refused to terminate the husband's mainte-
nance obligation after he and his former wife lived together follow-
ing the dissolution. a3 The court reasoned that both common sense
and the plain meaning of the words "another person" mandated a
denial of the husband's petition.' 39 The court specifically noted
that the wife's need for support had not diminished in any way as a
result of living with her former husband. 140 Moreover, underlying
the section 510(b) prohibition of maintenance if the recipient co-
habits with another is the right of the payor spouse to an account-
ing of fuqrds paid for support. 'W The court concluded that this
purpose is not frustrated when the payor resides with his former
spouse. 4 2 Additionally, the court determined that a contrary deci-
sion would contravene the public policy of favoring the reconcilia-
tion of disrupted marriages. 143
In In re Marriage of Reeder,14 the husband petitioned the court
to terminate his periodic maintenance payments pursuant to sec-
tion 510(b) of the IMDMA because his former wife was
136. Id.
137. 148 Ill. App. 3d 575, 499 N.E.2d 654 (2d Dist. 1986).
138. In Antonich, the dissolution judgment incorporated a written separation agree-
ment requiring the husband to pay weekly maintenance. The agreement provided for the
termination of maintenance at the end of five years or in the event any provision set forth
in section 510 occurred. Following the divorce, the couple resided together for eight
months on a connubial basis. After the wife moved out, the husband petitioned the court
to terminate his maintenance obligations pursuant to section 510(b) which provides for
maintenance termination if the receiver "cohabits with another person on a resident, con-
tinuing, conjugal basis." Antonich, 148 11. App. 3d. at 578-79, 499 N.E.2d at 656-57
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 para. 510(b) (1985)).
139. Id. at 578, 499 N.E.2d 655-56.
140. Id. at 578, 499 N.E.2d at 656-57.
141. Id. at 578, 499 N.E.2d at 657.
142. Id. at 578, 499 N.E.2d at 656-57.
143. Id. at 587-79, 599 N.E.2d at 657.
144. 145 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 495 N.E.2d 1383 (5th Dist. 1986). In Reeder, the hus-
band appealed the trial court's judgment denying his motion to discontinue maintenance
payments. Id. at 1015, 495 N.E.2d at 1384. At the time of the divorce action, Robert
Reeder was a forty-six-year-old employee of a coal company. Kathryn Reeder, forty-
three-years-old, worked as a cook. Neither party had a post-high-school education. The
couple was married for twenty-five years and had two children and two grandchildren.
The trial court found that Robert's earning potential was in excess of thirty-seven thou-
sand dollars per year. Kathryn, on the other hand, was employed at minimum wage.
The trial court awarded Kathryn periodic maintenance payments.
Subsequently, the wife moved in with a male divorcee who lived with both his minor
son and elderly mother. Id. at 1018-19, 495 N.E.2d at 1386. Kathryn lived in the base-
ment while the other three lived upstairs. Kathryn paid a monthly stipend to live in the
home. Moreover, she admitted engaging in sexual conduct with this man on a semi-
regular basis, but firmly maintained that she always slept alone in the basement.
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"cohabitating with another person.' 45 The court stated that sec-
tion 510(b) of the IMDMA does not aspire to control public
morals. Rather, the purpose underlying section 510(b) is to cease
maintenance payments when the receiving spouse enters into a
"husband-wife" relationship, whether legally or in fact. 146 The bur-
den of proving a de facto husband-wife relationship is on the
spouse seeking the discontinuation of maintenance. 147 Addition-
ally, the right to maintenance is not terminated simply because the
recipient spouse resides with a member of the opposite sex.148 Fo-
cusing on the independent aspects of Kathryn Reeder's life, the
court concluded that there was adequate evidence supporting the
view that Kathryn's need for support was not substantially affected
by her living arrangement and, therefore, a de facto husband-wife
relationship did not exist. 149 In In re Marriage of Tucker,' 50 a sep-
aration agreement was incorporated into the dissolution judgment
which provided that the husband would pay his ex-spouse mainte-
nance in the amount of twelve hundred dollars per month until she
died, remarried, or until he made the one hundred and twenty-first
payment, whichever happened first. 151 The husband petitioned the
court to terminate his maintenance obligations on the grounds that
his ex-wife was "cohabitating with another person" in violation of
section 510(b). 152 The trial court dismissed the action, holding that
145. For the content of section 510(b) see supra note 135.
146. Reeder, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1017, 495 N.E.2d at 1385.
147. Id. The court further stated the existence of such a relationship is a factual
question, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. Id. Evidence of fornication or sexual conduct between the recipi-
ent spouse and the individual with whom she is living is unnecessary to prove cohabita-
tion on a connubial basis under section 510. Id. at 1017-18, 495 N.E.2d at 1385-96 (citing
In re Marriage of Sappington, 106 I1. 2d 456, 468, 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (1985)).
148. Reeder, 145 Il1. App. 3d at 1018, 495 N.E.2d at 1386.
149. Id. at 1021, 495 N.E.2d at 1384. The court indicated that Kathryn and the man
with whom she was living maintained separate bank accounts and held no property to-
gether, that Kathryn did not make payments toward his mortgage payments and that she
reimbursed him for all long distance phone calls. Furthermore, Kathryn used her own
utensils and did nearly all of her own cooking. Kathryn possessed her own car which
was registered in her own name. Additionally, she did not participate in caring for the
man's son or in household duties. Kathryn shopped alone for her own groceries and
clothing. Finally, the court noted that there was no evidence that the couple traveled
together or that the man contributed monetarily or otherwise to Mrs. Reeder. Taking
these circumstances into account, the court ruled that although they may have decided
the issue differently because it did not approve of the couple's living arrangement, they
would not reverse the trial court's determination that the couple's situation did not con-
stitute a de facto husband-wife relationship. Id. at 1021, 495 N.E.2d at 1388.
150. 148 11. App. 3d 1097, 500 N.E.2d. 578 (4th Dist. 1986).
151. Id. at 1098-99, 500 N.E.2d at 579.
152. Id. at 1099, 500 N.E.2d at 579. For content of section 510(b), see supra note
135.
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the maintenance was in gross1 53 and, thus, was not subject to the
provisions in 510(b). 154
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision on differ-
ent grounds. 155 The court ruled that the issue was not whether the
maintenance was in gross, but rather, whether the parties intended
to have section 510(b) termination provisions apply to the dissolu-
tion agreement.156 The court concluded that the stipulations of the
agreement showed that the parties did not expect section 510(b)
termination provisions to apply, and, therefore, the terms of the
agreement specifically would be enforced.157
With the decision in Tucker, it appears clear that incorporated
settlement agreements will prevail over statutory provisions, pro-
vided that the agreements are not against public policy. In decid-
ing the above cases, the appellate courts have given practitioners
practical guidance about drafting documents and have given par-
ties practical guidance regarding the maintenance termination pro-
visions of 510(b).
The Antonich and Reeder decisions make clear that Illinois
courts will focus on the spouse's actual need for maintenance when
reviewing cohabitation situations. Although parties to these situa-
tions may have feared a moralistic judicial approach, these deci-
sions indicate that the economics of the circumstances will be the
determinative factor.
B. The Disappearance of Permanent Maintenance in Illinois
The IMDMA sets forth the requirements for maintenance
awards compelling the trial court to consider the time necessary to
procure satisfactory training or education to empower the spouse
seeking maintenance to attain suitable employment. 58 The legisla-
tive purpose behind maintenance is to enable the previously depen-
dent spouse to become financially self-reliant. 59 The First and
Fifth Districts issued two holdings denying the propriety of perma-
nent maintenance without review. In In re Marriage of Cal-
153. "'Maintenance in Gross'.. . [is] a nonmodifiable sum certain to be received by
the former spouse regardless of changes in circumstances." In re Marriage of Freeman,
106 Il. 2d 290, 298, 478 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1985).
154. Tucker, 148 Il. App. 3d at 1098, 500 N.E.2d at 579.
155. Id. at 1100, 500 N.E.2d at 580.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(b)(2) (1985). For text of 504(b)(2) see infra
note 166.
159. In re Marriage of Heller, 153 Ill. App. 3d 224, 235, 505 N.E.2d 1294, 1301 (1st
Dist. 1987).
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laway,'" the First District held that the IMDMA creates an
affirmative obligation on the spouse seeking maintenance to pursue
and accept appropriate employment.' 6'
In Callaway, the parties were married for thirty years and had
five children. The husband was forty-five-years-old and earned
thirty thousand dollars per year as a business manager at a college
in Chicago. The wife was forty-seven-years-old, never had worked
outside the home, and had only an eighth grade education. The
trial court awarded the wife unreviewable rehabilitative mainte-
nance for five years. The lower court based its decision on the fact
that the wife was only forty-seven-years-old, was in good health,
and had failed to introduce evidence of her inability to perform
work outside the home. 62 Furthermore, the court relied on evi-
dence that the wife rejected employment offers commensurate with
her education and experience. 63
On appeal, the wife contended that the trial court should have
awarded her permanent maintenance. The Callaway court rejected
the wife's argument, and agreed with the trial court that lack of
work experience and an eighth grade education were insufficient
limitations to support her request for permanent maintenance.164
The court determined that based on the wife's situation and back-
ground, the wife was entitled to an award of maintenance for five
years subject to review.' 65 The court stated, however, that if the
wife failed to make a good faith attempt to secure appropriate em-
ployment or declined such employment, the payments should be
terminated at the end of five years.' 66
160. 150 Ill. App. 3d 712, 502 N.E.2d 366 (1st Dist. 1986).
161. Id. at 716, 502 N.E.2d at 369-70.
162. Id. at 715, 502 N.E.2d at 369.
163. Id. at 716, 502 N.E.2d at 369.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 716-17, 502 N.E.2d at 369-70. The court further noted that had testimony
regarding an established standard of living been offered at trial a different result may have
ensued. Id. In In re Marriage of Heller, 153 11. App. 3d 224, 505 N.E.2d 1294 (1st Dist.
1987) the Appellate Court for the First District held that although the award of mainte-
nance was in accord with section 504 standards, the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding permanent maintenance without review. Section 504 of the IMDMA provides
as follows:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, or legal separation or declara-
tion of invalidity of marriage, or a proceeding following the dissolution of mar-
riage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the
court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse, only if it finds that the
spouse seeking maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him,
to provide for his reasonable needs, and
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As Callaway aptly demonstrates, the validity of any award of
permanent maintenance without review is in serious doubt. Both
courts noted the section 504 requirements, primarily focusing on
the recipient's affirmative duty to seek suitable employment. Based
on these decisions, the courts will seek evidence of absolute unem-
ployability to sustain a permanent award. Mere subsistence em-
ployment (as appeared to be the case in Callaway) will be
insufficient.
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home, or
(3) is otherwise without sufficient income.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of
time as the court deems just, made without regard to marital misconduct and
may be in gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time and the maintenance
may be made from the income or property of the other spouse after considera-
tion of all relevant factors including:
(1) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs indepen-
dently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living
with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties;
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(7) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective eco-
nomic circumstances of the parties.
(c) The court may grant and enforce the payment of such money for equitable
maintenance during the pendency of an appeal which is against the party receiv-
ing such equitable maintenance, as the court shall deem reasonable and proper.
(d) No maintenance shall accrue during the period in which a party is impris-
oned for failure to comply with the court's order for payment of such
maintenance.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504 (1985). See also Heller, 153 I1. App. 3d at 235, 505
N.E.2d at 1301. Mr. and Mrs. Heller were married for approximately twenty-one years.
Id. at 227, 505 N.E.2d at 1296. Floyd Heller was fifty-one years old and employed as an
associate professor at a local Chicago hospital at the time of the dissolution proceedings.
Carole Heller was forty-seven and possessed a Bachelor of Arts degree in elementary
education, but had not worked for twenty years. In addition, she had taken several culi-
nary classes during the marriage. At the time of the divorce proceedings, Carole was
earning one hundred and five dollars per week through part-time work at a travel agency.
The spouses marital property was valued at $886,927.00 and Carole's nonmarital assets
totalled $109,136.00. The trial court awarded Carole, inter alia, permanent maintenance
to terminate at her death.
The appellate court ruled that maintenance for five years subject to review was more
appropriate than a permanent award without review. Id. The court reasoned that be-
cause a party seeking maintenance has the affirmative duty to seek suitable employment,
the award should be reviewed in order to reappraise the dependent spouse's ability to
become monetarily independent. Id.
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C. Modification of Maintenance Awards in
Post-Judgment Proceedings
In a case of first impression, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District held that when a spouse has not specifically waived
or reserved any right to maintenance, it may be awarded pursuant
to a post-decree motion.I67 In In re Marriage of Popovich, an oral
agreement, which included property, visitation, and support provi-
sions, was incorporated into the dissolution judgment. The agree-
ment excluded any maintenance provision. 68 Three years later, the
wife petitioned the court for permanent periodic maintenance. The
husband moved to dismiss, contending that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to award maintenance in a post-decree proceeding.
The court disagreed and awarded the wife periodic maintenance in
the amount of three hundred dollars per month.' 69 The husband
appealed, contending both that the trial court lacked jurisdiction,
and that because the judgment order included no reservation of
maintenance, the wife should be presumed to have waived this
right. 170
The appellate court initiated its analysis by reiterating the gen-
eral rule that when a dissolution judgment is entered without a
maintenance provision, the spouses may not subsequently solicit
such an award.' 7' The court further stated that an exception to
this rule exists when a statute affords such a right. 172 An example
of such a statutory exception is a dissolution judgment entered by a
trial court that lacks personal jurisdiction over one or both of the
spouses.173 In determining whether the agreement was modifiable,
the court relied on section 502(f),1 74 which provides for automatic
167. In re Marriage of Popovich, 149 Ill. App. 3d 643, 500 N.E.2d 1109 (4th Dist.
1986).
168. Id. at 644, 500 N.E.2d at 1110. The only reference to maintenance was a single
sentence by the wife's counsel stating that it was not an issue at the time because the wife
was employed when the agreement was executed. Id. at 645, 500 N.E.2d at 1110.
169. Id. at 645, 500 N.E.2d at 1111.
170. Id. at 647, 500 N.E.2d at 1112.
171. Id. at 646, 300 N.E,2d at 1111.
172. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504(a) (1985)). For content of 504(c)
see supra note 166.
173. Id.
174. Section 502(f) of the IMDMA provides as follows:
Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of children, the
judgment may expressly preclude or limit modification of terms set forth in the
judgment if the agreement so provides. Otherwise, terms of an agreement set
forth in the judgment are automatically modified by modification of the
judgment.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 502(f) (1985).
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modifications of judgments absent express provisions precluding
such action.' 75
After determining the propriety of modification, the court ad-
dressed the primary issue of whether the wife waived her right to
maintenance by not reserving the issue in the initial dissolution de-
cree.' 76 The court held that waiver is a voluntary abdication of a
known right and will not be presumed without a clear, unambigu-
ous, and conclusive act."' After determining that the wife did not
commit any clear, unambiguous act, the court concluded the wife
did not waive her right to maintenance and thus was entitled to
petition the trial court for maintenance in a post-decree motion. 7 1
The Popovich court further noted the trend in Illinois is to at-
tempt to supplant ample property settlements in lieu of mainte-
nance. 79 The Popovich court rejected this approach in the present
case because the dissolution judgment was not clear and unequivo-
cal on the issue of awarding property instead of maintenance. 80
Finally, the court held that the reserved jurisdiction approach ap-
plies only in cases in which maintenance awards are subject to re-
evaluation.' 8 ' In the present case, the trial court failed to award
maintenance to the wife. Accordingly, the reserved jurisdiction ap-
proach was inapplicable. Therefore, absent a basis for reserved ju-
risdiction or waiver, the court upheld the trial court and ruled that
the court initially vested with subject matter jurisdiction over the
action is the proper forum for the post-judgment motion.18 2
D. The Rejection of "Maintenance in Gross"'' 13 Awards
In In re Marriage of Smith,'8 4 based on the facts of the case and
available alternatives, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District held that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
permanent maintenance in gross.' 85 In Smith, the trial court
awarded the wife maintenance in gross of twelve hundred dollars
per month for twelve years, and the husband appealed, arguing
175. Popovich, 149 Il. App. 3d at 647, 500 N.E.2d at 1112 (citing ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 49, para. 502(f) (1985)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 648, 500 N.E.2d at 1112.
179. Id. at 647-48, 500 N.E.2d at 1112.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 648, 500 N.E.2d 1112.
182. Id.
183. For a definition of "maintenance in gross" see supra note 153.
184. 150 Il1. App. 3d 34, 501 N.E.2d 1323 (3d Dist. 1986).
185. Id. at 36-37, 501 N.E.2d at 1324-25.
1988]
Loyola University Law Journal
that the wife should have been awarded periodic maintenance.8 6
The Smith court ruled that maintenance in gross is appropriate
when an award of periodic maintenance is inappropriate."8 7 The
Smith court concluded that appropriate circumstances did not ex-
ist to warrant the gross award. 8  The court stated that gross
awards may be proper in cases in which the payor spouse is likely,
in the future, to be unable to meet maintenance obligations. Unless
such circumstances exist, the trial court should either award the
standard form of periodic maintenance or, in the alternative, em-
ploy the reserved jurisdiction approach. 8 9 In dissent, Justice
Barry alleged his colleagues "merely.. . substituted their judgment
for that of the trial court in reversing the award."'g° Based on
Smith, there is likely to be a reduction in gross awards because
virtually all cases involve uncertainties about future predicaments
of spouses.
VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In In re Marriage of Kaplan, 19 the parties were married for six-
teen years and had one minor adopted son at the time of their di-
vorce. 192 The wife was an unemployed travel agent with various
health problems who previously earned one thousand dollars per
month and whose sole income was the temporary maintenance
award to her by the trial court. 93 The trial court ordered the hus-
band to pay seventy-five percent of the wife's attorney's fees as well
as those of his minor child and himself. The husband appealed.' 94
On appeal, the husband contended that because of his lack of
resources, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to
pay seventy-five percent of his ex-wife's attorney's fees.' 95 The ap-
pellate court rejected the husband's argument and affirmed the trial
186. In Smith, the husband was a successful dentist facing a potential decline in his
practice due to both health problems and the economic community in which he prac-
ticed. Id. at 36, 501 N.E.2d at 1324. The wife was a certified high.school teacher capable
of securing appropriate employment.
187. Id. (citing Dmitroca v. Dmitroca, 79 I11. App. 2d 220, 223 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist.
1967)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 37, 501 N.E.2d at 1325 (Barry, J. dissenting).
191. 149 Ii. App. 3d 23, 500 N.E.2d 612 (1st Dist. 1986).
192. Id. at 26, 500 N.E.2d at 614-15.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 28, 500 N.E.2d at 616.
195. Id. at 34, 500 N.E.2d at 620. There were several other issues appealed by the
husband which are not presently discussed.
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court's award of fees. 196 The court reasoned that although the
party for whom legal services are performed has the primary obli-
gation of payment,' 97 if that party can demonstrate-an inability to
pay attorney's fees and an ability of the other spouse to do so, the
trial court has the discretion to award such fees in the dissolution
action.' 9s In the present case, the wife's only income was the tem-
porary maintenance award and her only substantial asset was the
marital home. The appellate court refused to order her to sell the
home because doing so would defeat the lower court's effort at eq-
uitable distribution of the marital assets. 199
In In re Marriage of Bashwiner,2° the Appellate Court for the
First District in a consolidated appeal held that it is proper for a
spouse to petition the trial court for attorney's fees after the disso-
lution judgment is entered but while ancillary issues such as a rule
to show cause, property disposition, custody, removal, and peti-
tions for injunctive relief are pending before the trial court.20 ' In
Bashwiner, the parties were involved in protracted litigation in
which the wife petitioned the court for attorney's fees incurred in
defending a motion to vacate and her defense of a temporary re-
straining order and preliminary injunction. In a post-judgment
proceeding, the trial court awarded the wife attorney's fees. The
husband contended that by awarding fees, the trial court erred for
two reasons. First, the husband argued that the wife did not claim
that the attorney's services rendered were reasonable. Additionally,
the husband argued that attorney's fees may not be awarded for
services rendered in opposition to a motion to a preliminary
injunction.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's determination that
it subsequently lacked jurisdiction to award attorney's fees because
there were other matters relating to the case pending before the
trial court.20 2 The court held that although the wife could have
sought prospective fees for her appeal before prosecuting the ap-
peal, it was beneficial to await the appellate court's decision be-
196. Id. at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 620.
197. Id. at 34-35, 500 N.E.2d at 620. See In re Marriage of Jacobsen, 89 Ill. App. 3d
273, 276, 411 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1st Dist. 1980).
198. Kaplan, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 620. See In re Marriage of Owen,
108 111. App. 3d 808, 814, 439 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (1st Dist. 1982).
199. Kaplan, 149 I1. App. 3d at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 620. See Kenly v. Kenly, 47 I1.
App. 3d 694, 497, 365 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1st Dist, 1977).
200. 155 I1. App. 3d 531, 508 N.E.2d 419 (1st Dist. 1987).
201. Id, at 538, 508 N.E.2d at 423.
202. Id. at 536, 508 N.E.2d at 423. The pending issues included petitions for a rule to
show cause and petitions for injunctive relief.
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cause the wife then would know the precise amount of incurred
fees.210 The court explained that approaching the issue in this way
avoids piecemeal litigation. 204 Thus, the appellate court remanded
the cause to the trial court for further consideration. The court
further upheld the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife
for costs incurred in defending the temporary restraining order.
The award properly matched the precise amount of damages suf-
fered from the injunctive relief and was thus in accord with section
11-100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.20 5
In In re Marriage of Baltzer,2° the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District held that attorneys in divorce proceedings are
considered "parties in interest" in an action for attorney's fees.207
In Baltzer, the wife's former attorney filed a section 508(C) 208 peti-
tion for attorney's fees in Cook County although dissolution pro-
ceedings were still pending in DuPage County. The wife filed a
motion in the dissolution proceeding in DuPage County for an or-
der striking the fee action of the attorney, or alternatively, for an
order requiring the attorney to seek fees in the pending divorce
action. The lawyer specially appeared and moved to quash the
wife's motion. The trial court denied the lawyer's motion to quash
and directed the attorney to dismiss the separate action.2c9
On appeal, the attorney contended he was not a party to the
dissolution action and thus was not subject to the jurisdiction of
the DuPage County Court.210 On appeal, the court considered
whether the attorney is a real party in interest and thus barred
from a separate action for attorney's fees while the divorce action
was still pending.21' The Baltzer court explained the purpose of
section 508 of the IMDMA is to promote judicial economy by
abolishing the necessity for counsel to prosecute a separate action
against his client for the collection of fees.212 The court stated fur-
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 150 III. App. 3d 890, 502 N.E.2d 459 (2d Dist. 1986).
207. Id. at 893, 502 N.E.2d at 462.
208. Section 508(c) of the IMDMA provides as follows:
The court may order that the award of attorney's fees and costs hereunder shall
be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce such order in his name, or
that they be paid to the relevant party. Judgment may be entered and enforce-
ment thereof had accordingly.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 508(c) (1985).
209. Baltzer, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 893, 502 N.E.2d at 461.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 893, 502 N.E.2d at 462.
212. Id. at 895, 502 N.E.2d at 462-63.
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ther that efficient administration of justice bars one state court
from disregarding pending actions in another state court.2t 3 Ac-
cordingly, the court ruled that an attorney's petition for fees is not
a separate and distinct action from the divorce proceedings but,
rather, a petition is a part of the original proceedings.
The appellate court held further that the first court to obtain
jurisdiction over the divorce action maintains jurisdiction over at-
torney's fees to the exclusion of all other courts until thirty days
after the entry of the final dissolution judgment. 2 4 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the former attorney was barred from bring-
ing a separate action for fees in another court. Section 508,
however, does not appear to require the attorney to litigate in the
court that had original jurisdiction, nor would an argument to pro-
mote judicial economy appear to require litigation in that court.
Because litigants will likely present this issue in the future, the an-
swer to this question will be forthcoming.
VIII. POST DECREE
In In re Marriage of Brust,2 5 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fifth District held that the dissolution judgment that provided for
payment by the parties of educational and related expenses not ex-
ceeding four years, permitted the son to pursue a wholly unrelated
course of study after attaining a two-year associate's degree.216
The trial court ordered, inter alia, the husband to pay two-thirds
and the wife one-third of the child's tuition, books, fees, and rea-
sonably necessary living expenses, including the cost of automobile
expenses and upkeep for a period not exceeding four years.217 The
son initially obtained a two-year associate's degree in mining tech-
nology to which the wife contributed one-third of the incurred ex-
penses. 218 Prior to graduating, the son applied to another school to
pursue a two-year degree in heating and refrigeration.2t 9 In a post-
decree motion, the husband petitioned the court for contribution
213. Id. at 895, 502 N.E.2d at 463.
214. Id. Furthermore, the original trial court has the authority to issue injunctions
enjoining attorneys from proceeding in other courts. Id. Although the court decided
that the initial trial court retains such jurisdiction over pending actions, it specifically
stated it would not decide whether section 508 affords the exclusive relief for attorney's
fees following the expiration of the trial court's jurisdiction. Id. at 896, 502 N.E.2d at
464.
215. 145 Ill. App. 3d 257, 495 N.E.2d 133 (5th Dist. 1986).
216. Id. at 261, 495 N.E.2d at 135.
217. Id. at 258, 495 N.E.2d at 133.
218. Id. dt 259, 495 N.E.2d at 134.
219. Id.
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from his ex-wife for one-third of their son's educational and related
expenses for his first year of attending heating and refrigeration
school after previously attaining an associate's degree in mining
technology, which was financed by both parties. The wife refused
to pay because she believed the son attained the degree r equired by
the dissolution judgment which provided the wife was to pay one-
third of all educational and related expenses that were "not to ex-
ceed four years of such schooling. ' 220 The trial court held that the
mother fulfilled her obligation regarding payment of the child's ed-
ucational expenses when the son earned his initial two-year associ-
ate degree.22' The trial court treated the son's second degree in
heating and refrigeration as a specialization not encompassed
within the son's initial degree in mining technology. 2  Finally, the
trial court concluded that the four-year term was not a grant; but
rather was a limitation. The term was intended to be a cut-off date
which required a continuous course of instruction and not a source
of income for the child if the child was so inclined to view it that
way. 223
On appeal, the court addressed whether the dissolution judg-
ment intended to provide the child with four years of undergradu-
ate education or merely one degree, the duration of which was
limited to four years.224 The appellate court held that the parties
intended to provide an undergraduate college education for their
son.225 The court analogized the situation to one in which a stu-
dent at a four-year college changes his major midstream.226 The
court reasoned that because a student typically takes four years to
complete his undergraduate studies, it is equitable in light of sec-
tion 513 of the IMDMA 227 for the parties to contribute to the son's
expenses icurred in his third year.228
Although the husband did not request contribution from his
wife for the fourth year of the son's schooling, the court addressed
220. Id. at 258, 495 N.E.2d at 133.
221. Id. at 259, 495 N.E.2d at 134.
222. Id. In support of the son's second degree, the father introduced testimony of the
supervisor and chief electrician of a coal company where the son resided and who had
input in the hiring of prospective employees who stated that technical training might aid
a prospective employee "since mining equipment is heated and air conditioned and in
view of the economic difficulties of the coal industry and the competition for jobs there."
Id. at 259, 495 N.E.2d at 134.
223. Id. at 260, 495 N.E.2d at 134.
224. Id. at 261, 495 N.E.2d at 135.
225. Id. at 262, 495 N.E.2d at 136.
226. Id. at 261, 495 N.E.2d at 135.
227. For the content of section 513, see infra note 230.
228. Id. at 261, 495 N.E.2d at 136.
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this issue. The appellate court held that the income earned by the
son is relevant and should be considered by the trial court.229 The
court reasoned that section 513230 mandates that such a grant re-
quires consideration of the son's financial resources.23' The court
specifically stated that portions of the son's income should be de-
voted to securing his education rather than enhancing his lifes-
tyle.232 The court further noted that the son was employed full
time and attending an out-of-state school with higher tuition than
a state school. Consequently, the appellate court remanded the
cause to the trial court to calculate how much the son and parents
could equitably be required to contribute to his educational
expenses.233
IX. GRANDPARENTAL VISITATION
Grandparental visitation is governed by section 607(b)2 34 of the
229. Id.
230. Section 513 of the IMDMA provides as follows:
The court may award sums of money out of the property and income of
either or both parties for the support of the child or children of the parties who
have attained majority and are not otherwise emancipated only when such child
is mentally or physically disabled; and the application therefor may be made
before or after such child had attained majority age. The Court may also make
such provision for the education and maintenance of the child or children
whether of minor or majority age, out of the property and income of either both
of its parents as equity may require, whether application is made therefor before
or after such child has, or children have, attained majority age. In making such
awards, the court shall consider all relevant factors which shall appear reason-
able and necessary, including:
(a) The financial resources of both parents.
(b) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved.
(c) The financial resources of the child.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513 (1985).
231. Brust, 145 I1. App. 3d at 264, 495 N.E.2d at 135-36.
232. Id. at 261, 495 N.E.2d at 136.
233. Id.
234. Section 607(b) of the IMDMA provides as follows:
The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or
great-grandparent of any minor child upon the grandparents' or great-grand-
parents' petition to the court, with notice to the parties required to be notified
under Section 601 of the Act, if the court determines that it is in the best inter-
ests and welfare of the child and may issue any necessary orders to enforce such
visitation privileges. Further, the court, pursuant to this subsection, may grant
reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or great-grandparent whose
child has died where the court determines that it is in the best interests and
welfare of the child; moreover, the adoption of the minor child by the spouse of
the child's surviving parent shall not preclude consideration by the court as to
whether granting visitation privileges to such grandparents or great-grandpar-
ents is in the best interests and welfare of the child. Further, adoption of the
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IMDMA. In Bush v. Squellati,211 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Third District held that, pursuant to section 607(b), grandpa-
rental visitation is not authorized in cases in which the parental
rights of both biological parents are terminated during the mar-
riage by consent to adoption by other relatives.236 In Bush, the
child suffered from cerebral palsy and the natural parents author-
ized the child's adoption by the child's aunt and uncle. Subse-
quently, the parents were divorced and the child's maternal
grandparents sued the grandmother's sister and brother-in-law for
visitation privileges. The trial court granted the grandparents visi-
tation privileges.237
On appeal, the court addressed whether the trial court acted
within its authority in ordering grandparental visitation.3 s In re-
versing the trial court, the appellate court reasoned that permitting
grandparental visitation under these circumstances could frustrate
the legislature's intention of maximizing the pool of potential adop-
tive parents.239 The court reasoned that the termination of all pa-
rental rights would be conducive toward establishing a stable
family environment for the adoptive parents free from unnecessary
intrusion.240
The dissent in Bush stated that the law itself could be read to
either support or deny visitation in this situation, but that ulti-
mately a policy decision was involved.2 1 Certainly, the majority
strictly construed the legislative intent of section 607(b). The ma-
jority also stated, however, that even if the grandparents' petition
was in accord with the section 607(b) requirements, the court was
not convinced that visitation would have been in the child's best
interests.242 This finding may seem harsh, leading some to agree
with the dissent, and to ask whether public policy should favor
visitation by grandparents in this situation.
minor by the spouse of a legal parent after termination of the parental rights of
the other parent does not preclude granting visitation privileges to a grandpar-
ent or great-grandparent under this subparagraph (b); however, the court may
impose restrictions upon such visitation privileges in order to prevent contact
between the minor and the parent whose parental rights have been terminated.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1985).
235. 154 I1. App. 3d 727, 506 N.E.2d 972 (5th Dist. 1986).
236. Id. at 730, 506 N.E.2d at 974-75.
237. Id. at 728, 506 N.E.2d at 973.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 731, 506 N.E.2d at 975 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
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X. DISSOLUTION
In Brandon v. Caisse,2 43 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Sec-
ond District considered whether before the entry of a dissolution
judgment the death of a spouse abates a dissolution action. In
Brandon, a formal written order was entered reciting as a fact that
grounds for dissolution were proved. The trial on the various is-
sues lasted four days. The wife died three days after the final argu-
ments were presented. Subsequently, Mr. Brandon moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the divorce proceedings abated upon
the wife's death. The trial court denied the husband's motion be-
cause its previous finding that grounds existed would be construed
as a "judgment" for purposes of 401(3).2" The appellate court re-
versed and held that unless a dissolution judgment has been en-
tered under section 401(3)245 of the IMDMA, the death of the
spouse abates a dissolution action,246 regardless of whether the ac-
tion is ripe for judgment.
In In re Marriage of Zuidam,247 the appellate court held that the
husband's purchase of a lottery ticket after the execution of a prop-
erty agreement was not a circumstance that would render the
agreement unconscionable248 and require it to be set aside.249 In
Zuidam, the spouses negotiated a property settlement agreement.
The trial court, before final judgment, ordered the agreement to be
made part of the judgment and directed the parties and attorneys
to sign the judgment. At that point, the parties had partially per-
formed the agreement by dividing the jointly held bank accounts.
Pursuant to the trial court's directions, the spouses signed and de-
livered the judgment, which included the property settlement
agreement. Because the presiding judge was on vacation, he did
243. 145 I1. App. 3d 1070, 496 N.E.2d 755 (2d Dist. 1986).
244. Id. at 1071, 496 N.E.2d at 755-56.
245. "The death of a party subsequent to entry of a judgment for dissolution but
before judgment on reserved issues shall not abate the proceedings." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
40, para. 401(2)(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
246. Brandon, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1073, 496 N.E.2;k.at 756.
247. No. 86-2825, slip. op. (1st Dist. October 6, 1487).
248. The Zuidam court defined unconscionability as follows:
The standard of unconscionability is used in commercial law, where its meaning
includes protection against onesidedness, oppression, or unfair surprise .... If
the court finds the agreement not unconscionable, its terms respecting property
division and maintenance may not be altered by the court .... An agreement is
not unconscionable where it has been negotiated for several months, both par-
ties were represented by counsel, there was no allegation of fraud, and it was
not sufficiently onesided.
Id. at 6.
249. Id. at 7-8.
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not sign and enter the judgment on that date.2"'
Subsequently, the husband purchased an Illinois lottery ticket
with his own cash. The husband won 2.1 million dollars. After
learning about his winnings on the news on August 26, 1987, the
wife filed an emergency motion to stay the entry of the dissolution
judgment on August 27, 1987. The trial court denied the wife's
motion and entered the dissolution judgment on August 28, 1987,
incorporating the property agreement. The wife appealed this
decision.25
The court, relying on section 502(b), 2 ruled that the agree-
ments of parties to a divorce action are no longer reviewable with
respect to maintenance and property disposition, as long as the
terms of the agreement are not unconscionable. The court held
the terms not unconscionable, and upheld the property settle-
ment.25 4 The court noted that "but for" the judge's absence, the
judgment would have been proper and correct in all respects.255
The parties made a full disclosure of their respective assets prior to
the execution of the agreement.256 Further, the winning lottery
ticket was not among the contingent assets in the agreement.25 7
The court reasoned that had the agreement been set aside, the pub-
lic policy of the IMDMA to favor properly negotiated property
settlements would be frustrated; and further, an inundation of
avoidable litigation could ensue.258
As the Zuidam decision makes clear, a trial court is without
power to amend the terms of a settlement agreement, except those
terms relating to children. Consequently, unless the agreement is
unconscionable, the parties must abide by their own decisions as
reflected in the agreement. The court could find no basis for hold-
ing the agreement unconscionable, in the face of free disclosure by
the parties and the wife's stipulation that the agreement and judg-
250. Id. at 3.
251. Id.
252. Section 502(b) of the IMDMA provides as follows:
The terms of the agreement, except those providing for the support, custody
and visitation of children, are binding upon the court unless it finds, after con-
sidering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evi-
dence produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court,
that the agreement is unconscionable.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 502(b) (1985).
253. Zuidam, slip. op. at 5-6.
254. Id. at 6.
255. Id. at 7.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 8.
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ment would have been proper and valid had the trial judge not
been on vacation.
Practitioners are now apprised that a windfall occurring before
entry of the final judgment but following a hearing and a fully exe-
cuted agreement with stipulations will not serve to set aside the
agreement. A different result would likely have arisen, however, if
there had been children involved.
XI. LEGISLATION
A. Child Custody-Modification
Public Act 85-746,259 effective September 23, 1987, provides that
a court shall not modify a prior child custody judgment unless it
makes certain findings.2w Prior to this change in the statute, such
findings were required only after the expiration of two years after
the date of the prior judgment. Other than this change, section 610
of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act remains
the same.
B. Interspousal Torts
Public Act 85-625,26 1 effective January 1, 1988, provides that a
husband and wife may sue each other for torts committed during
their marriage.262 Prior to this enactment, one spouse was prohib-
ited from suing the other spouse for torts committed during the
marriage except for intentional torts in which one spouse caused
physical harm to the other.
C. Support- Withholding Orders
Public Act 85-222,263 effective August 23, 1987, provides for an
expanded definition of income. 264 This amendment to the Public
Aid Code now includes as income profit sharing payments, bo-
nuses, vacation pay, insurance proceeds, and lottery prize
awards.265
Public Act 85-221,266 effective January 1, 1988, provides that an
order for withholding with respect to support must direct a payor
259. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 525 (West).
260. Id.
261. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 35 (West).
262. Id.
263. 1987 I1. Legis. Serv. 595 (West).
264. Id. at 596.
265. Id. at 265.
266. 1987 I1. Legis. Serv. 558 (West).
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to withhold an amount not less than twenty percent until the pay-
ment of any delinquency.267 The Act also now requires that notice
be sent if the payor is thirty days late in paying.268 The same shall
now apply to the Uniform Reciprocal Act.
XII. CONCLUSION
The previously discussed Survey period decisions leave family
law practitioners with a better understanding of the current state of
Illinois family law in some areas; and yet somewhat more confused
in other areas. For example, the appellate courts, specifically the
Third and Fourth Districts, are split on the propriety of agree-
ments between ex-spouses that tie non-payment of maintenance to
the forbearance of visitation rights. Furthermore, the First, Sec-
ond, and Fifth District Appellate Courts have apparently agreed
and have held that the independent consideration of goodwill is
proper in valuing closely held and professional corporations in dis-
solution proceedings. Regarding maintenance, the appellate courts
are apparently abolishing permanent awards without review. Addi-
tionally, the appellate courts appear to be eliminating gross awards
absent extenuating circumstances. Finally, in a case of first im-
pression, the Fourth District Appellate Court upheld the awarding
of maintenance in a post-decree motion when the petitioning
spouse neither waived nor reserved the right to maintenance. The
upcoming Survey year probably will include decisions both solidi-
fying the current state of the law and reconciling the conflicting
appellate districts.
267. Id. at 559.
268. Id. at 560.
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